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Financial technology (FinTech) has the potential to be a positive, game-changing force 
for boosting financial inclusion in ASEAN, as mobile money and greater access to basic 
financial services have the capacity to improve the economic well-being of households. Indeed, 
technology has been shown to drive broader increases in economic growth, which itself interacts 
positively with financial inclusion. In a more direct way, new, specific fintech developments 
globally and in ASEAN itself can be beneficial for financial inclusion. In this paper, we look at 
financial inclusion and technology, and how cooperative efforts between ASEAN policymakers, 
the private sector, and their broader communities can promote financial stability and inclusive 
growth through the deployment of fintech applications supported by cloud-computing, big data 
analytics, the Internet-of-Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI), blockchain technologies and 
cryptocurrencies. 




      
 
From Technology to Inclusion 
Technology lies at the heart of both economic growth and financial inclusion. 
 
Technology and Growth 
Modern economic literature regarding the role of technology in driving growth is heavily 
influenced by the work of Robert Solow. Solow’s theoretical growth model explains growth 
using the physical inputs of labor and capital, plus a variable to capture technological change.  
Notably, Solow’s model does not attempt to explain what drives technology. Subsequent to 
laying out his theoretical model, Solow later empirically tried to measure the determinants of 
economic growth, leading to a field of research known as “growth accounting.” By his 
calculations, Solow estimated that seven-eighths of US economic growth per capita could be 
attributed to technological change and only one-eighth to changes in the capital stock1.  
Over the past half century, the theoretical models have been expanded to make 
technological change endogenous and the empirical estimations have become more 
sophisticated2,3.  Nevertheless, this extensive and still-growing body of theoretical and empirical 
research enduringly finds a central role for technology in explaining economic growth4. 
 
1 Solow, R. Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 39 (3) (1957). 
2 Romer, P. Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94 (5) 
(1986): 1002 - 1037. 
3 Romer, P. Endogenous Technological Change. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.98 (5, Part 2) 
(1990): S71-S102. 
4 Abramovitz, M.  The Search for the Sources of Growth: Areas of Ignorance, Old and New. The Journal of 





Another way to think about this dynamic is to look at a long historical timeline of 
economic activity and to take note of important technological innovations. Economic historians 
have looked at pre-modern economies and their growth for as far back as the past 2,000 years5 
and a striking feature of these estimates is the relative absence of growth for eighteen centuries, 
followed by a "super exponential" kink. The current period of explosive economic growth has 
led to research that focuses on a few breakthroughs, termed “general purpose technologies” or 
GPTs, which lead to many subsequent innovations.  
[Figure 1] 
ARPANET/internet & the IT revolution. A classic example from recent years is the 
internet, the precursor of which was work done through the U.S. Defense Department's 
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET). ARPA-funded researchers 
developed many of the protocols used for internet communication and the internet6, in turn, 
spawned entire new industries and also transformed the way existing industries operate.  
More recently, some economists have argued that the productivity slowdown of the 
1970s7 was reversed temporarily as a result of the “IT revolution” that followed the introduction 
of the internet8.  
Artificial Intelligence. Artificial Intelligence (or AI) is a GPT that many believe may be 
the largest technology revolution of our times. Arguably, AI is more disruptive than even the 
 
5 Maddison, A. Contours of the World Economy, 1–2030AD. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
6 Hauben, M., Hauben, R., Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet. Los Alamitos, 
CA: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1997. 
7 Productivity growth is a key determinant of economic growth. Productivity in the U.S. grew rapidly in the 
post-war era to the early 1970s, slowed during 1970s to early 1990s, and then increased substantially in the 
mid-1990s; the average annual rate for the three periods are respectively 2.7%, 1.5%, 2.5% — Jorgenson D. 
W., Ho. M. S., Stiroh, K. J., A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Volume 22, Number 1, (2008): 3–24. 
8 Basu, S., Fernald, J. Information and Communications Technology as a General Purpose Technology: 





printing press, electricity, the automobile, and the internet in that AI creates an entirely new 
factor of production. Using recent algorithmic techniques, such as so-called Machine Learning 
and Deep Learning, AI has the potential to solve complex problems fast and, in doing so, 
leverage human ingenuity and free up time towards more creative and productive endeavors. It is 
expected that data-driven technologies will underpin future prosperity. Another important feature 
of AI is that its tools and techniques are not confined to the lab and are no longer the preserve of 
researchers like Alan Turing, a pioneer who laid the groundwork for the discipline sixty year ago. 
Libraries of AI models are on the web. Learning datasets are available for self-service, and, 
especially, are within the company itself. AI, like the personal computer of the 80s, will very 
quickly blend into the background and become part of the broad fabric of business and 
household life. 
A consultancy study analyzed9 the long-term economic impact of AI by modelling the 
dozen developed countries generating more than half of the world’s economic output. This study 
concluded that AI has the potential to double a country’s GDP growth rate by 2035. 
 
Technology and Finance 
Related to but separate from the Solow-inspired literature on economic growth and 
growth accounting is another strand of research on the relationship between finance and growth. 
Empirically, papers like those of Ross Levine and Sara Zervos consistently find evidence that 
financial markets provide important services that improve a country’s long-run economic 
growth10. Today, technology is revolutionizing the way the finance industry operates, leading 
widespread use of the term “financial technology” or fintech. Actually, the term financial 
 




technology has been around for close to fifty years with perhaps its first appearance in a 1972 
research report by Hanover Trust which is now part of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.11 A recent 
meta-analysis of research papers concluded that “fintech” can be defined as "a new financial 
industry that applies technology to improve financial activities."12  Fintech activities can be 
classified into the subsectors of payments, alternate forms of lending and credit products, 
consumer finance, and wealth management. Box 1 describes Kenya's financial innovation and 
the M-PESA suite. 
Aside from these fintech subsectors, technology has also enabled the creation of virtual 
currencies. Virtual currencies typically use blockchain, or distributed-ledger, technology; there 
are currently nearly 6,000 virtual currencies, with a pioneer being Bitcoin13. Virtual currencies 
do not need a central authority to exist; however, virtual currencies in the form of Central Bank 
Digital Currencies (CBDCs), a digital form of fiat money issued by a sovereign entity, have 
recently been attracting increased attention14. At this early stage, the potential impact of virtual 
currencies including CBDCs on economic growth is unclear. 
 
Technology and Inclusion 
It is widely accepted among policymakers that financial inclusion matters for growth and 
poverty alleviation. At a macroeconomic level, economic historians Comin and Mestieri estimate 
 
10 Levine, R., Zervos, S. Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth. The American Economic Review, 
Vol.88 (3) (1998): 537 - 558. 
11 Bettinger, A. FINTECH: A Series of 40 Time Shared Models Used at Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Company. Interfaces, 2 (4) (1972). 
12 Schueffel, P. Taming the Beast: A Scientific Definition of Fintech. Journal of Innovation Management 4 
(4) (2016). 
13 https://coinmarketcap.com/, accessed July 22, 2020. 
14 A 2018 survey of 63 central banks representing over 90% of the world’s economic output found that 
about 70% of respondents were currently, or were soon to be, engaged in CBDC work — Barontini, C., 
Holden, H., Proceeding with caution – a survey on central bank digital currency. Bank for International 




that over 80% of income disparity between rich and poor countries can be explained by different 
rates of technology diffusion since the 1800's15. Not surprisingly, financial inclusion, spurred by 
the technological developments of fintech — with, for instance, the emergence of mobile money 
and mobile banking as enablers of financial inclusion, has recently moved up the reform agenda 
with more than 60 countries launching or developing a national strategy16.  
However, the relationship between fintech, financial inclusion and economic growth is 
not yet well understood, and research on the topic is relatively sparse. The main reason is that 
national policies on financial inclusion are recent, and assessing their impact on a country’s 
growth will take time. Studies are also limited by the absence of decade-long time-series on 
financial inclusion measures. Data limitations are even greater for the direct examination of the 
relationship between fintech use and financial inclusion.  
Yet, from a theoretical point of view, classic economic ideas are helpful in explaining the 
underpinnings of the new economy of the internet and in describing how digital technologies 
impact economic development. As early as 1937, Ronald Coase17 first contributed the notion of 
transaction costs to economic theory and recognized their crucial importance; one can argue that 
new digital technologies tend to reduce transaction costs such as those associated with barriers to 
market participation or information asymmetries.  
[Figure 2] 
Figure 2 provides a stylized representation of the effects of falling transactions costs18. 
From highest cost to lowest cost, transactions can ideally be ranked; first, those which are too 
costly to take place in the pre-internet / pre-digital technologies era (exclusion) — e.g. providing 
 
15 Comin, D., A., Mestieri, M. If technology has arrived, why has income diverged? National Bureau of 
Economic Research (2013). 
16 https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview, accessed July 22, 2020. 




traditional banking services to remote rural areas; second, those which are becoming cheaper 
thanks to new technologies (efficiency) — e.g. commerce; and third, those where transaction 
costs are negligible at the margin (new economy sector and innovation) — e.g. onboarding a new 
customer once a platform business is up. By lowering transaction costs, digital technologies help 
promote inclusion, increase efficiency, and foster innovation. 
An emerging body of research is showing the potentially significant impact of fintech on 
financial inclusion which then can affect economic growth. The channels from financial 
inclusion to growth can be from the supply side (additional income for banks and microfinance 
institutions (MFIs)) and the consumer side (cost saving from formal payments and interest 
earned on formal savings). Some research shows the potentially significant impact of financial 
inclusion on economic growth. Beck et al. 19  have empirically estimated the causal positive 
impact of financial depth, a concept related to financial inclusion, on greater economic growth 
and GDP per capita. Sahay et al.20 also show that financial inclusion increases economic growth, 
but that macroeconomic gains diminish as financial inclusion and depth increase. Recent 
research finds that greater financial inclusion can make a 2%- 3% point difference in economic 
growth21. 
At the same time, fintech and financial inclusion have also recently moved up the agenda 
at central banks, as they turn to the policy challenge of inclusive growth, and linkages between 
financial inclusion and macroeconomic policies become important — for example, greater 
financial inclusion may impact the interest rate channel of monetary transmission and the role of 
 
18 World Bank. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016. 
19 Beck, T, Ross, L., Norman, L. Finance and the sources of growth. Journal of Financial Economics, 
Volume 58, Issues 1–2, (2000): 261-300. 
20 Sahay et al. Financial Inclusion: Can It Meet Multiple Macroeconomic Goals? Washington, DC: 




interest rate in the economy22.  In short, financial inclusion can affect macroeconomic policies 
(and growth), which in turn can affect financial inclusion, highlighting the likely interactions 
between all of the variables in focus in this paper: financial technology, financial inclusion, and 
economic growth. 
  While the rapid growth of fintech in recent years is undeniable, whether households and 
businesses adopt these new technologies cannot be taken for granted. Additionally, the degree to 
which they decide to adopt these technologies can determine the link between fintech and 
inclusion. A recent study by Loh shows that in high-tech Singapore, households exhibit status-
quo bias, preferring to use ATMs for point-of-sale services and funds transfers that could be 
done digitally23. Using a natural experiment of customers who experience the closure of their 
favorite ATM, Loh finds that this “nudge” can help customers overcome their status quo bias and 
adopt the fintech innovation, assuming they have choices. In the next section, we illustrate some 
structural and behavioral challenges to financial inclusion in ASEAN as we explore why mobile 
money, although created in the Philippines, did not gain broad consumer acceptance, while it is 
ubiquitous in Kenya and has overtaken other traditional payment systems — see Box 1. ASEAN 
countries can learn from each other, and other regions of the world, but distinctive country-
specific approaches, calibrated to their own country strategies, may be warranted.   
 
 
21 Lipton, D. “Central Bankers and Inclusive Growth: Building a Framework for Financial Inclusion.” April 
22, 2017. Accessed July 23, 2020. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/04/22/sp042217-central-
bankers-and-inclusive-growth-building-a-framework-for-financial-inclusion 
22  Yetman, J. Adapting monetary policy to increasing financial inclusion. Bank for International 
Settlements (2017). 
23 Choi, H., Loh, R. Physical frictions and digital banking adoption. Sim Kee Boon Institute for Financial 




Technology and Inclusion in ASEAN 
The rest of this paper examines the specific case of ASEAN, and how developments in 
the region’s fintech industry are affecting financial inclusion. First, we describe the region's 
significantly diverse levels of economic development and financial inclusion. Second, we 
examine the role of start-ups and regulation in ASEAN’s fintech industry, and provide some 
leading case studies.  Third, we address the future role of “super apps” in ASEAN’s fintech 
landscape. Fourth, we frame digital innovation within the broader context of ASEAN 
Connectivity, and its role as one of five strategic areas with the potential to drive greater 
competitiveness and inclusiveness. 
 
ASEAN’s Heterogeneous Current Conditions 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a loose federation of states, 
similar in many ways to the European Economic Community of the 1960s following the 1957 
Treaty of Rome, is a regional organization aimed at bringing economic integration to its member 
states. It is culturally and economically diverse, and a vast regional market. 
Its young24 and dynamic 648 million people live in ten states, as small as Brunei with its 
population of 428,000 and as large as Indonesia, with 268 million. They speak a dozen main 
languages; they live in democracies in Indonesia and the Philippines, in the People's Democratic 
Republic of Lao, in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, or in a constitutional monarchy in 
Thailand. There are Malaysia and Indonesia and their Muslim population, Catholic Philippines, 
and Buddhist Myanmar; and Singapore and its GDP per capita of USD 65,000 and Cambodia's 
of USD 1,600.  
 




With ten countries at various stages of development, the impact of technology in 
ASEAN is, not-surprisingly, vastly different from one country to the other, given the wide 
variation in income-levels, infrastructure, and technology adoption.  
Financial inclusion refers to the delivery of financial services and products to all, and 
especially to the unbanked or underserved. Research shows25 that tackling this challenge could 
increase GDP by between 9% and 14% in Indonesia and the Philippines, and propel Cambodia's 
GDP as high as 32%.  
A marker for financial inclusion is account statistics on access to, and usage of, formal or 
informal financial services. Financial inclusion matters not only for its potential for improving 
socio-economic outcomes and influencing the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, but also 
for highlighting the underlying technologies which increasingly enable it. Digital financial 
services, mobile money services, payment cards, and other fintech applications are today 
supported by cloud-computing, big data analytics, IoT, AI, blockchain technologies and crypto-
currencies.  
While Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand have an adult population with significant 
access to formal or informal26 financial services (more than 80% have an account), access in 
CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam) is low, less than 30%, and half of adult 
Indonesians, a staggering 92 million people, still have no access, even though the country has 
made tremendous progress over the few past years — 20% with no access to financial services in 
2011, and 36% in 2014 (Fig. 3). Indonesia may face the problem of geographic dispersion with 
more than 17,000 islands and a landmass similar in size to 2,600 times that of Singapore, or one-
fifth of that of China; however, a large size in itself is not an insurmountable barrier, as China 
 
25 Asian Development Bank. Accelerating financial inclusion in South East Asia with digital finance. Metro 




demonstrates with 80% account ownership. The heterogeneity of financial services provided is 
also meaningful across countries. Countries such as Singapore, at the cutting edge of financial 
technology, provide a full range of digital solutions — payments, savings, credit, insurance, and 
wealth management, while others, e.g. Cambodia or Laos, simply aim to provide access to basic 
financial services such as the ability to store, send, or transact money — a given in advanced 
economies. 
[Figure 3] 
Mobile phones increasingly encapsulate these transformative technologies and services; 
mobile money accounts allow people to store money, send electronic payments, receive 
remittances, or participate, for example, in agricultural markets. These originally simple 
communication tools have morphed into affordable service platforms, delivering innovative 
applications and transforming lives in the developing world. 
In ASEAN, digital enablement is largely driven by the supply side, where regulatory and 
public policy actions play a significant role in trying to create a favorable environment. For 
instance, the Indonesian government launched in 2016 its National Strategy for Financial 
Inclusion whose main objective is to reduce the unbanked to 25% of the adult population within 
three years; its focus is on those unreachable by formal financial services — low-income 
communities (lowest 40%), small and micro businesses (e.g. entrepreneur with limited resources 
for business expansion), and cross-community groups such as those in outlying islands, 
women27, or students28. The strategy includes fintech branchless banking programs such as Laku 
Pandai29, which could help overcome the country’s geographical barriers to financial inclusion. 
 
26 An example of an informal financial service would be pawn shops. 
27 In 2014, only 37% of Indonesian women had an account at a formal financial institution. 
28 Students and youth estimates are about 107 million, or 42%, of Indonesia's population in 2015. 




A short time after, an Indonesian financial services authority, the OJK30, developed regulations 
for digital financial services delivered through fintech, as well as rules for peer-to-peer lending 
platforms.  
In light of the recent push to increase financial inclusion, and clients to migrate towards 
digital financial services, Indonesian banks have been changing their strategies. Recent surveys31 
indicate that Indonesian banks are likely to invest in technology, as they view technology as the 
primary driver of business transformation. And more than a quarter of respondents express 
concern that fintech players will disrupt their bank’s business by intensifying competition. Box 2 
illustrates how, in the Philippines, UnionBank pursues its digital transformation to service the 
unbanked and the underserved. 
For the ASEAN regulator, finding a balance between the benefits of increased 
competition and the risks of disrupting traditional banking is important, and the Indonesian 
government is encouraging synergies and collaboration between traditional banks and fintech 
companies. However, how will technology-based new entrants behave, by disrupting or 
collaborating with incumbents?  
The National Bank of Cambodia has answered this question by setting the infrastructure 
for its CBDC, the Bakong, with the cooperation of a consortium of a dozen domestic banks, 
where the aim is "to create financially inclusive ecosystems that all the stakeholders in the 
industry can benefit from"32. Box 3 provides an overview of the Bakong CBDC. 
 
 
30 OJK: Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. 
31 PwC. Indonesia Banking Survey 2017. PwC Indonesia, 2017. 
    PwC. Indonesia Banking Survey 2018. PwC Indonesia, 2018. 




ASEAN’s Fintech Start-Ups 
Typically, we observe that fintech subsectors are at different stages of maturity within the 
region and within countries. Some of the world’s largest fintech unicorns are in the Payments 
subsector, such as Stripe from the US; so, it is not surprising that the ability to transact is also the 
starting point for markets in ASEAN. As one could expect with the process of financial inclusion, 
activity starts with payments, then moves to alternate forms of lending and credit products, then 
consumer finance, and finally wealth management. 
[Figure 4] 
Spurred by the Indonesian government's National Strategy for Financial Inclusion, 
Indonesia has a booming payments subsector with 62 payments start-ups. Singapore is ASEAN's 
fintech hotspot with about 100 fintech companies per million capita, and a mature sector 
encompassing the whole spectrum from Payments to Wealth Management; Singapore companies 
are typically bred to one day expand overseas, after being incubated in the small domestic market 
— Boxes 4 and 5 describe the markets of two Singapore fintech start-ups expanding globally, 
and the particular role they play in fostering financial inclusion. Malaysia is the emerging fintech 
hub; it takes advantage of its geographic proximity with neighboring Singapore to capture 
innovation and talent spillover effects. Moreover, it is the low cost cousin of Singapore with a 
cost of living a third that of Singapore. With an annual USD 30 billion worth of remittances in 
the Philippines, the remittance subsector sees a lot of traction in the Philippines.  
Key investors are from Silicon Valley but domestic ASEAN venture capitalists are 
equally active, if not more.  
There is a strong policy support for promoting innovation and financial inclusion, as 




developing regulation allowing fintech entrepreneurs to safely test their new products, under 
looser rules. Thailand has already established rules, even though its fintech sector is just nascent. 
Indonesia and Philippines account for more than half of ASEAN population. Indonesia 
has undergone a rapid transformation, from high school science education33 to adults' financial 
inclusion. However, less that 1% of Indonesians has ever used mobile money, 99% of all bills 
are paid in cash, even though 51% of adult population has access to internet and mobile 
subscription rate is 142% of the country's population. In the Philippines, twenty years after 
having inventing mobile money, Filipinos still heavily rely on cash while the country tops the 
world internet usage with 10 hours a day; the reasons for this reliance on cash are numerous34. 
To cite a few: cash is perceived as inexpensive and convenient while digital payment solutions 
are still costly relative to income levels of a large swath of the population; lack of trust, concerns 
about fraud, and the absence of recourse mechanisms hamper the shift to digital payments; lack 
of information on e-money platforms as half of the population is unaware of their existence; for 
businesses, the incentives to switch away from checks are not overwhelming while suppliers are 
still mainly paper-based; the large size of the informal economy, officially estimated at 35% of 
GDP but twice that size according to commercial bankers when taking into account tax 
avoidance activity35; however, the overarching reasons are financial exclusion — two-thirds of 
Filipinos do not own an account or digital wallet, and the limited infrastructure outside urban 
centers like Metro Manila — consumers experience dropped calls due to insufficient mobile 
connectivity that stands at a cell tower density of 1.5 4G stations per 10,000 subscribers, the 
lowest 4G availability in ASEAN36. Three years ago, Jack Ma of Alibaba addressed a Filipino 
 
33 OECD. Indonesia Country Note – Results from PISA 2015. Paris: OECD, 2016.  
34 Hokans, J. Lessons from the Philippines’ Journey to Digital Payments. Better Than Cash Alliance, 2015. 
35 Hokans, J. Country Diagnostic: Philippines. Better Than Cash Alliance, 2015. 




audience37: “Philippines, I think you have the opportunity to make the best TechFin or FinTech 
in the world.” It is a long way to realize this vision but various actors, from the private sector to 
the government, are working to make the country’s financial sector more inclusive and efficient. 
In 2018, there were 62 payments start-ups in Indonesia, and 47 in alternate forms lending 
and credit products. This is perhaps not surprising, as the use of informal financial services is 
commonplace. Only 17% of the adult population borrowed money from a financial institution in 
2017, but most borrowed from family, friends, or neighbors. Indonesians also see the informal 
saving or lending groups, known as "arisan"38, as a trusted loan-distribution system. An arisan is 
a social club, akin to an informal credit union, whose members are bound by trust as well as 
similar backgrounds or interests. Meeting at each member’s home in a rotating fashion, a lottery 
system ensures that each member has the chance to be an arisan holder. The arisan helps fund, 
typically through an interest-free loan from peer members, the purchase of the then-arisan holder, 
e.g. a wedding, household appliances, a business venture, school fees, expenses that are 
otherwise difficult to fund through traditional bank loans and other forms of credit. In the 
Philippines, only 10% of the adult population has borrowed money from a financial institution in 
2017, but 41% borrowed from family, friends, or neighbors — this is the highest rate in 
ASEAN39. These habits are opportunities for fintech companies to create new customers by 
incorporating these local aspects into their services. One such company is Mapan 40 , an 
Indonesia-based technology social enterprise that builds on arisan’s strong social bond to help 
lower income communities become financially self-sufficient and access otherwise inaccessible 
products and services through its platform. Mapan's business model does not rely on funding or 
 
37 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZK-SSwbqAY, accessed July 25, 2020. 
38 Lit. "social gathering". 
39  World Bank. The Global Findex Database 2017: Measuring Financial Inclusion and the Fintech 




investment but on its buying power or its own manufacturing of products by local enterprises. 
With the leverage of technology, Mapan has over 3 million members, 250,000 agents and 115 
branch offices across rural areas of Java and Bali. Founded in 2009, it has been acquired by 
Indonesia fintech giant GoJek in 2017. 
With an annual USD 30 billion worth of remittances in the Philippines, this subsector 
sees a lot of traction with ten start-ups. It is also worth noting the active Cryptocurrency and 
Blockchain subsector with twenty start-ups. Here again, one sees the important role of the 
regulator in spurring or curbing fintech innovation. The Philippines Central Bank recognized41 in 
early 2017 the potential for virtual currencies systems to "revolutionize delivery of financial 
services, particularly for payments and remittance, in view of their ability to provide faster and 
more economical transfer of funds, both domestic and international, and may further support 
financial inclusion." 
There are five Indonesian unicorns — these privately held start-up companies valued at 
over USD 1 billion. Gojek, a ride-hailing and a "Super App"; Tokopedia, and its tagline, 
“Democratizing commerce through technology”; Ovo, a digital platform for financial services; 
Bukalapak, e-commerce and a platform for mom-and-pop stores, such as warungs; Traveloka, 
travel and life style services. 
Gojek and Tokopedia help highlight some key points of the largest Indonesian unicorns, 
and conjecture how their future could impact people and businesses in some scenarios, and how 
these scenarios could also develop in the rest of ASEAN. 
[Figure 5] 
 
40 Mapan https://www.mapan.id/insidemapan/, accessed July 25, 2020. 
41 Espenilla, N. Guidelines for Virtual Currency (VC) Exchanges. Circular No 944 Series of 2017. Bankgo 




At a USD 5 billion valuation in 2019, Gojek would be comparable to the total market 
capitalization of the Travel & Leisure companies in the Consumer Services sector of the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange 42 . It has an impressive array of global investors, including 
Indonesia's Astra, US's Google, Singapore's Temasek, and China's Tencent. Tokopedia is not 
outdone with US's Sequoia Capital, Japan's Softbank Group, and China's Alibaba. The first 
Indonesian unicorn, Gojek started as a simple ride-hailing service in 2010 with twenty motorbike 
drivers; it added three services in 2015, and today it has more than twenty services -- from food, 
to groceries, to massages. In 2017, it acquired three large fintech firms in Indonesia43 in order to 
expand its payments business. And in 2019, it bought an AI recruiting platform in Bangalore, 
India44.  
 
The Role of “Super Apps” in ASEAN 
Tokopedia's best-known product is its marketplace for merchants and buyers. It also 
provides digital financial products such as credit, utility payments, and credit cards. More 
recently, Tokopedia offers more sophisticated fintech products — wallets, insurance products, 
credit scoring capabilities, etc. 
Like WeChat of Tencent and China, these apps are on their way to becoming "Super 
Apps", or multi-purpose platforms. In most markets, smartphone users have 80 apps or more on 
their phone, and use about 40 of them each month45; in China, users can do everything in the 
WeChat Super App, facilitating its adoption — pay bills, book doctor appointments, hail taxis, 
hold video conferences, access bank services, or play games. However, in the case of WeChat, it 
 
42 Author's calculations. https://markets.ft.com/data, accessed September 16, 2019. 





is increasingly difficult for users to opt out given the application's dominance, state censorship of 
foreign alternatives, and further integration into users' daily life by progressively becoming 
China's digital ID system. A Super App is a data-gathering device. In the age of cloud-computing, 
big data analytics, and AI, Facebook is a marketer's go-to place; however, a Super App is a 
marketer's dream. It is also a banker's dream. One key competitive advantage of banks is Know 
Your Customers’ businesses (KYC), because banks lend them money; in essence, banks have 
access to information. This could change as a Super App has the potential to erode banks' key 
competitive advantages — KYC, access to funds, reputation, and regulatory barriers. 
We already touched on KYC with the Super App and its data being a banker's dream. We 
also have highlighted a Super App's access to capital. A Super App has superior information, 
gathered across multiple touch-points, online and offline. As important is its ability to mine 
customers' data for estimating and calibrating new consumer credit models via machine-learning 
algorithms, and create, thanks to information asymmetry reduction, new, viable and profitable 
markets for the under-banked, or less capital-intensive credit businesses with alternative forms of 
lending46. Not surprisingly, Facebook saw the value of its platform for payments and financial 
inclusion, among other motivations, when it announced in 2019 its intention to create Libra, a 
digital currency "for billions of people [to use] around the world"47.  
When it comes to reputation, a Super App's large customer base is already won, and 
offering an additional service is the customer's expectation. Take Tokopedia and its large 
customer base of reportedly four million merchants and 80 million monthly active users cutting 
through Indonesian society. We do not have the details of Tokopedia's functional and technology 
 
45 App Annie. 2017 Retrospective Report. https://www.appannie.com/en/insights/market-data/app-annie-
2017-retrospective, accessed September 16, 2019. 




"stacks" but one can safely assume that its business strategy and fintech product offering will 
expand further, with Ant Financial's fintech platform and Alibaba's multiple investments in the 
company48. Alibaba's spinoff, Ant Financial, offers the entire spectrum of financial services from 
payments, to credit, to banking, to wealth management (Fig. 6). After all, these technical 
capabilities at Alibaba and Tencent, are in part what is behind China's impressive trajectory 
towards financial inclusion49.  
[Figure 6] 
How the story will play in a particular jurisdiction, greatly hinges on the regulatory 
environment, the so-called RegTech, as well as structural factors such as infrastructure 
development. Again, if we look at China's experience, the country is a leader in fintech because 
the policymaker, among other measures, has provided the regulatory space for innovations in 
digital finance50, and has allowed the establishment of new types of financial service providers; 
the country's trajectory towards universal financial inclusion, to achieve a "moderately 
prosperous society", xiǎokāng shèhuì, 小康社會 51, has been impressive over the past 15 years, 
as account ownership is now at 80%, a level comparable to that of other G-20 countries52 — 
although, in absolute terms, this means that about 230 millions of adults are still unbanked. 
Earlier, we pointed to the roles of the National Bank of Cambodia and the Philippines Central 
Bank in allowing virtual currencies systems to develop. In Singapore, the fintech leader in 
 
47 The Libra Association. Libra White Paper v2.0, https://libra.org/en-us/whitepaper, accessed August 10, 
2020. 
48 Investments in 2017 and 2018. 
49 World Bank. Toward Universal Financial Inclusion in China. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018. 
50 State Council. Plan for Advancing the Development of Financial Inclusion (2016-2020), 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/335801453407732220/ENGLISH-Advancing-Financial-Inclusion-in-
China-Five-Year-Plan-2016-2020.pdf, accessed July 28, 2020. 
51 Ibid. 




ASEAN, "regulation [runs] alongside innovation", and regulation is calibrated53 to the risk to 
the financial system posed by new technologies, with materiality and proportionality tests. 
An important issue on regulation is that of data sovereignty, and more specifically for 
Indonesia and Vietnam in ASEAN, data localization. Data sovereignty is the notion that data is 
subject to the laws of the jurisdiction where it is collected; the idea became important after 
Edward Snowden, an American whistleblower, revealed highly classified information about the 
US NSA global surveillance program54, collecting data from people around the world. Data 
localization goes further than data sovereignty. It requires that data about a country's residents 
must be collected, processed, and stored onshore, before possibly being transferred offshore.  
The implications of such laws are important for e-Commerce and fintech. Besides being 
seen as protectionist measures, they may slow the speed of innovation because of the relative 
lack of local data centers and associated ecosystems. For example, Amazon Web Services 
(AWS), a major cloud-computing platform provider, was still not present in Indonesia for most 
of 2019 because of the country's data localization laws and the inefficiency of running local data 
centers versus regional ones, while the local volume is still small; only in October 2019 was the 
regulation amended55,56 and AWS announced local data center opening for early 2022. That said, 
following its internationalization strategy in Asia, Alibaba is already providing cloud-computing 
services in Indonesia. 
So, if or when, this Super App player scenario disrupting the incumbent financial 
companies develops, the customer base, cutting through all social strata and groups, would be 
 
53  Menon, R. Singapore’s FinTech Journey – Where We Are, What Is Next? Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, FinTech Conference, 2016. 
54 PRISM, United States National Security Agency. 
55 Indonesia Government Regulation 71 amending 2012 Government Regulation 82 of Concerning 
Electronic System and Transaction Operation. 




better off because of access to a wider array of available financial products, in exchange for 
handing off its entire personal data to a central authority — much like Facebook is offering its 
platform for free in exchange for its users' personal data. Is this a completely desirable outcome? 
What are the incentives for this central player to behave well, when the greater incentive may be 
to exploit its market power? 
The answer is that there may be a role to play for alternative lenders, but with an 
infrastructure that combines decentralization and fintech, and that is enabled by blockchain 
technology. Alternative lenders could achieve an even greater purposeful finance, i.e. improving 
people's lives, in this scenario of decentralization of control among network participants, 
programmable economy, sharing economy, selective data disclosure, and asset tokenization. The 
Super App scenario is developing in Indonesia; will it also happen in the rest of ASEAN? 
 
ASEAN Connectivity 
At the end of the colonial rule, some observers were predicting that Southeast Asia would 
collapse as new national states were coming into being. In 1962, British historian and geographer 
C.A. Fisher57 colorfully and metaphorically described the region as the “Balkans of the Orient”, 
as both regions were “areas of transition and instability” sitting on “cultural and political fault 
zones”. While ASEAN’s current heterogeneity has previously been highlighted, on the eve of 
self-determination, even more obstacles indeed lay ahead, domestic and international. Within 
borders, vastly differing ethnic groups, values, religions, and languages were challenges to nation 
building and national unity, and in a deeply divided cold war environment and its alliance system, 
region building faced its own crisis as an ideological war in Vietnam claimed lives and spread to 




changing geopolitical conditions and economic shocks, and embraced globalization. For instance, 
“the minute city state of Singapore, […] like a head without a body”58, i.e. without access to 
natural resources, would undergo a rapid industrialization and achieve an exceptionally high 
average growth rate of more than 8% from the 1960s to late 1990s. 
In the 21st century, in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that would rapidly 
engulf and badly affect the region, ASEAN envisioned the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) to intensify cooperation and better respond to regional and global shocks, with economic 
integration as the end goal. Blueprints and master plans will articulate the vision of a highly 
integrated and inclusive region.  
The Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity 2025 59  is “to achieve a seamlessly and 
comprehensively connected and integrated ASEAN that will promote competitiveness, 
inclusiveness, and a greater sense of Community”, with deliverables across five strategic areas: 
sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence, and 
people mobility — digital innovation identified as a significant potential source of economic 
activity, supported by a backbone infrastructure, and regulatory frameworks for new digital 
services to ensure that gains are inclusive. Effective implementation to realize the vision and go 
beyond a narrative are critical, but ASEAN cannot ignore the technological change and digital 
technology global megatrends that will impact its economies and its people60.  
 
 
57 Fisher, C. Southeast Asia: The Balkans of The Orient? Geography, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1962): 347-367 
58 Ibid. 
59 ASEAN. Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity 2025. Jakarta: ASEAN, 2016. 
60 A consultancy estimated that, by 2028, technology will displace 28 million workers and alter jobs in 
ASEAN, underlining the need for a strategy to produce skills that are complemented by, rather than 





In this paper, we looked at financial inclusion and technology in ASEAN against the 
backdrop of the region’s digital economy unfolding at an unprecedented pace — its digital 
transformation spurred by technological diffusion, the spread of ideas, innovation, and shaped by 
responsive regulatory frameworks. The signs are visible and plenty — innovative start-ups using 
technology to grow, tech social enterprises benefiting communities, tech unicorns delivering 
gains for consumers, and increasing financial inclusion driven by policy and market 
opportunities. We highlighted the interactions and linkages between financial technology, 
financial inclusion, and economic growth. We underlined how cooperative efforts between 
ASEAN policymakers, the private sector, and communities attempt to promote financial stability 
and inclusive growth through the deployment of fintech applications supported by cloud-
computing, big data analytics, the Internet-of-Things, artificial intelligence, blockchain 
technologies and cryptocurrencies. The picture presented here remains nonetheless incomplete, 
not least considering the recent, dynamic, and evolving subject matter we covered. 
Fintech can be a positive, game-changing force for boosting financial inclusion in 
ASEAN, as mobile money and greater access to basic financial services, for instance, have the 
capacity to improve the economic well-being of households. However, the overarching 
conclusions of this paper are that ASEAN countries can learn from each other, and other regions 
of the world, but distinctive country-specific approaches, calibrated to their own country 
strategies, may be warranted. Further, fintech and technological change are not easy panaceas for 
economic development but factors among several, such as infrastructure, regulatory environment, 




While we examined the technology megatrend, which cuts across national boundaries, 
deglobalization may be an emerging trend with the potential to reshape social, economic, 
technological, and geopolitical conditions; furthermore, the post-Covid-19 pandemic world may 
settle in a new normal.  A regionalization of the world would certainly present new challenges, 
and could slow economic and inclusive growth. While recognizing and managing the risks borne 
out of more transformative changes, the new normal should be an opportunity for fintech and 
technology to exert an even greater impact and play a greater role in ASEAN’s collective 
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Box 1 Kenya’s M-PESA Mobile Money 
The Philippines was the first country to introduce mobile money back in 2001 with Smart 
Communications, Inc., a domestic telecommunications provider reaching out to underserved 
markets. Globe Telecommunications, another domestic Mobile Network Operator (MNO), 
followed in 2004. The digital platforms enabled their users to transfer funds, pay bills, purchase 
goods, and remittances to flow via SMS. However, growth was slow, owing to idiosyncratic 
structural and behavioral challenges, and, twenty years later, the share of digital payments is 
negligible, Filipinos still rely heavily on cash, and two-thirds do not own a financial services 
account or digital wallet. 
The story played out differently in the East African country of Kenya. In 2007, in this 
country of 39 million people, but only 4.6 ATMs per 100,000 adults61 and 1360 bank branches62, 
85% of the population did not have access to banking services. Safaricom, the country’s leading 
MNO, identifying an opportunity to address last-mile distribution of financial services through 
low-cost digitally enabled access points, responded to a market need by launching M-PESA63 — 
originally a money transfer service built on top of the mobile phone. Unbanked and underserved 
people could now send, receive and store money using a simple, secure, and cheaper than cash 
solution.  
Starting with the readily available market of urban-rural remittances, M-PESA rapidly 
became more ubiquitous and part of Kenyans' daily lives. By 2011, M-PESA had 15 million 
 
61 World Bank Global Financial Development Database, 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=1250&series=GFDD.AI.25, accessed August 5, 
2020. 
62 Author's calculations, and World Bank Global Financial Development Database, 





subscribers64 — or 63.5% of the adult population, a 39,400 strong agent network countrywide 
(the traditional bank equivalent of a branch); in 2018, mobile money transactions were 
equivalent to nearly half of Kenya’s GDP65. Financial inclusion among Kenyans, as measured by 
account ownership, increased rapidly from 42% in 2011 to 82% in 2017, with no urban-rural 
divide66.  
More financial innovation beyond payments came with the launch of the also largely 
popular M-Shwari product67 in 2012, instantly bringing traditional banking services such as 
credit and interest-bearing savings accounts to 22 million M-Pesa users. Four months after its 
launch, M-Shwari boasted 1.2 million banking customers68, and 19.5 million accounts were 
created by July 2017 — more than the accounts of the next two largest bank competitors 
combined69. 
The effect of mobile money on household welfare has famously been brought to 
everyone’s attention by Suri and Jack 70  who find that mobile money causes economic 
development, and who estimate that access to the Kenyan mobile money system M-PESA 
increased per capita consumption levels and lifted 194,000 households, 2% of Kenyan 
 
 
63 M-PESA: M for Mobile, pesa meaning money in Swahili. 
64 Safaricom. Safaricom Annual Report and Financial Statements 2012. 
https://www.safaricom.co.ke/investor-relation/financials/reports/annual-reports, accessed August 5, 2020. 
65 Author's calculations. Central Bank of Kenya, https://www.centralbank.go.ke/national-payments-
system/mobile-payments/#, https://www.centralbank.go.ke/annual-gdp/, 
accessed August 5, 2020.  
66 Ibid, 32. 
67 M-Shwari: M for Mobile, shwari meaning smoothen or making something better in Swahili. 
68 Safaricom. Safaricom Annual Report and Financial Statements 2013. 
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Washington, D.C. (2017). 
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households, out of poverty. At the firm-level, Beck et al.71 find that M-Pesa helps entrepreneurs 
access trade credit and that it has the power to promote economic development — its availability 
increases the macroeconomic output of the Kenyan entrepreneurial sector by as much as 0.5%. 
However, these findings do not imply that fintech and technological changes are easy panaceas 
for economic development but factors among several, such as infrastructure, regulatory 
environment, or human development.  
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Box 2 The Digital Transformation of UnionBank of the Philippines 
The largest banks in the Philippines have generally not made large investments in internal 
digital transformations. Philippine banks only spend around 2% of their operating incomes on 
digital upgrades compared to the 7% spent by ASEAN leaders in Singapore and Malaysia72. The 
exception is UnionBank, the country’s bank with the reputation of being the most tech-savvy, 
and whose stated end goal is achieving "greater access to financial services for all Filipinos, 
particularly the unbanked and the underserved"73. Likening itself to an IT company with a 
banking franchise, the bank, through its own fintech subsidiary, strives to attract new customers 
by creating new communities and ecosystems. 
Rural banks, microfinance entities, and cooperatives in the Philippines often offer the 
only physical financial presence for those living in the provinces. By serving what would 
traditionally be seen as rivals, UnionBank takes care of the digital banking aspects of these 
lenders to farmers, fishermen, and microenterprises so that they can focus on their core business 
and bring financial services within the reach of more Filipinos. For example, through 
UnionBank's platform utilizing blockchain technology, the process of domestic remittances from 
one rural bank to another is streamlined, cross-border remittances made by overseas Filipino 
workers is a matter of minutes rather than days, and rural banks can connect to the country’s 
main banking networks and grow their markets74. 
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Box 3 The National Bank of Cambodia and its Bakong CBDC 
The regulator set up the infrastructure for a digital local currency in the dollarized 
economy of Cambodia. The banking private sector now has the ability to reach the poor in an 
economic and profitable way, by offering digital bank accounts and means of payment in local 
currency. Cross-border trade activities are also facilitated as visiting tourists from neighboring 







The Bakong journey 
Source: National Bank of Cambodia, November 2019. 
 
Bakong key considerations 
➢ Financial Inclusion 
- Access to financial services, especially in rural areas 
- Respond to real demand for wider use of electronic payments 
- Mobile phone penetration greater than bank accounts ownership 
- Build a cashless society 
 
➢ Use of the Khmer Riel (KHR) for retail payments 
- Build a non-dollarized economy 
 
➢ Resolve issues of interconnectivity and interoperability 
- Banks and payment service institutions operate on a common platform 
➢ Real-time-gross settlement  
- Immediate finality of payments through DLT 
- Reduced burden on liquidity management and regulatory compliance for 





➢ Use of DLT to attain efficiency 
- Better service at lower transaction costs 
Technically, Bakong should be thought more as a payment gateway rather than a "pure" 
retail CBDC, as there is, for example, no access to the balance sheet of National Bank of 
Cambodia, nor monetary policy: 
- Universal; for banks, firms and households  
- Co-existence with present banking system 
- Available 24/7 
- Electronic and DLT-based; permissioned system 
- National-currency denominated, 1:1 exchange rate with KHR 



















Bakong functional overview 





Box 4 Remittances, Poverty alleviation, and Technology — a Singapore Fintech 
About 270 million people live outside of their countries of birth, and over 750 million 
migrate within their countries75 . Remittances are transfers made by migrants to families or 
communities back home; they have grown almost six-fold to USD 689 billion76 in the past 
twenty years, represent four times the net official development assistance and official aid 
received globally77, and are a vital source of income for developing countries. For example, in 
2018, the Philippines were the fourth largest remittance recipient globally with USD 34 billion 
remittance inflows, or about 10% of its GDP. 
There is a strong association between remittances and poverty reduction, not only from 
the direct increase in household income but also from the improvement of health, education, and 
economic outcomes in recipient communities78. Today's remittances payments infrastructure still 
largely rests on the so-called correspondent banking system of the 1970s, an intricate array of 
intermediary banks moving funds, and charging fees, between the sender and the recipient. Key 
cost drivers of the remittance market are the lack of competition in certain corridors, regulatory 
issues, and a complex payment infrastructure. It then follows that enhancing the effectiveness of 
the remittance market, by reducing costs and increasing access, may not only enable a more 
efficient market, but also advance the international development agenda; indeed, cutting 
transaction cost by 5% can save up to USD 16 billion a year79.  
 
 
75  International Organization for Migration. World Migration Report 2020. 2019. https://read.un-
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77 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD, accessed July 22, 2020. 
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With fintech unfolding, the remittance industry saw a shift to digital with start-ups 
developing new cross-border payments messaging and settlement systems. The most notable of 
them is Ripple's, a US technology company, and, in ASEAN, Nium, a Singapore based start-up 
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Box 5 Collateralized Lending to Farmers in Myanmar — a Singapore Fintech 
Myanmar is one the poorest nations in Southeast Asia, suffering from decades of internal 
conflict, stagnation, mismanagement, and isolation.  Myanmar’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) — a measure of human development summarizing life expectancy, access to knowledge, 
and standard of living, stands at 0.584 in 2018, positioning Myanmar at 145 out of 189 
countries 81 . The country's GDP per capita lags those of the other countries in the CMLV 
(Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam) group at USD 1,400.  
Founded in 2015, Singapore start-up InfoCorp Technologies aims to bring inclusive 
financial services to the livestock industry by unlocking the so-called dead capital of the 
unbanked82. Dead capital represents assets owned by poor or middle-class people in emerging 
economies, capital trapped in the informal sector of the economy and which cannot be monetized 
due to poor infrastructure, policies or bureaucracy; it is estimated at about USD 10 trillion 
globally83. Some argue that these assets could foster development if they were, first, recognized 
and then brought into the mainstream market economy84. 
InfoCorp believes that its "AgriTech" solution, supported by blockchain technology and 
IoT devices, can help uniquely identify livestock (by inserting a digital chip into the animal), 
formalize in a public ledger the until-then informally-held property rights of the farmer, and 
subsequently obtain cattle insurance and credit in the form of a collateralized loan. In 2018, it 
 
81  United Nations. 2019 Human Development Report. Briefing note, Myanmar. 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MMR.pdf, accessed July 24, 2020. 
82 Infocorp, https://infocorp.io, accessed July 24, 2020. 
83 De Soto, H. The Mystery of Capital. UK: Black Swan, 2001. 
84  Brefort, L. Unlocking the Dead Capital. World Bank. 2010. 





signed an agreement with the Myanmar Ministry of Agriculture85 and Myanma Insurance86, an 
arm of the Ministry of Planning and Finance, to pilot its solution.  
 
85 "Government partners with Fintech firms to enable use of livestock as collateral." Myanmar Times, May 
17, 2018. Accessed July 24, 2020. https://www.mmtimes.com/news/government-partners-fintech-firms-
enable-use-livestock-collateral.html 




























































































Note: As of May 2020. 

















Sources: Alibaba, Ant Financial, https://www.antfin.com/family.html, accessed September 16, 
2019. 
 
